In a biometric verification system, leakage of biometric data leads to permanent identity loss since original biometric data are inherently linked to a user. Further, various types of attacks on a biometric system may reveal the original template and utilize in other applications. To address these security and privacy concerns, cancelable biometric has been introduced. Cancelable biometric derives a protected template from the original biometric template using transformation functions and performs comparison between templates in the transformed domain. Recent approaches toward cancelable fingerprint generation either rely on aligning minutiae points with respect to singular points (core/delta) or utilize the absolute coordinate positions of minutiae points. We propose a noninvertible ridge feature transformation method to protect the original fingerprint template information. The proposed method partitions the fingerprint region into a number of sectors with reference to each minutia point employing a ridge-based co-ordinate system. The nearest-neighbor minutiae points in each sector are identified, and ridge-based features are computed. Further, a cancelable template is generated by applying the Cantor pairing function followed by random projection. We have evaluated our method with FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006 databases. It is evident from the experimental results that the proposed method outperforms existing methods in the literature. Moreover, the security analysis demonstrates that the proposed method fulfills the necessary requirements of noninvertibility, revocability, and diversity with a minor performance degradation caused due to cancelable transformation.
Introduction
Compromise of the stored biometric template causes permanent identity theft of a user as biometric data are irreplaceable and irrevocable. There are various types of attacks and privacy concerns linked with sharing of biometric information across multiple applications. 1,2 Jain et al. 3 identified four levels of attacks in a biometric system. At the first level, the attacker presents a falsified biometric input to the sensor, and the sensor may not be able to differentiate between genuine and fake biometric inputs. Second, the attacker intercepts the communication link between different modules to enter into the system. At the third level, the attacker intercepts the executable program of a module to get the desired output. Such attacks are called Trojan-horse attacks. At the final level, the attacker replaces/derives a spoof of the stored template, which causes the security breach. Therefore, biometric template protection is necessary to address such security challenges. To provide biometric template protection against the afore-mentioned attacks, an idea of cancelable biometrics has been presented. The cancelable biometric scheme applies a transformation to derive a protected template, which is used for verification instead of the original template of a user. The transformation relies on a noninvertible function such that it is hard to retrieve the original template even if the attacker knows the transformed template and transformation function. In a compromise situation, a new protected template can be derived by altering the parameter values of the transformation function. The transformation should fulfill the following requirements described by Breebaart et al.: 4 1. Noninvertibility: It should be computationally hard to construct the original template from the transformed template. This prevents the recovery of the original biometric information by an imposter. 2. Diversity: Identical cancelable template should not be used in different applications to avoid cross-matching of the stored template. 3. Revocability: The transformation should be able to derive numerous protected templates from the same biometric input, and there should be immediate revocation in case of compromise. 4. Performance: The transformation should not exhibit significant performance degradation.
First, Bolle et al. 5 introduced a practical implementation for the cancelable transformation onto four biometric modalities. Next, "biohashing" 6 based transformation came into effect. The biohashing-based approaches proposed in Refs. 6 and 7 combine a user-specific key onto the original biometric features to derive a protected template. BioHashing and its variants 6, 7 are proved to be impractical if the unique seed is compromised. Ahmad et al. 8 proposed a fingerprint template protection scheme that uses relative minutiae information in the polar coordinate system as described in Ref. 9 . The proposed scheme underperforms on FVC2002 DB3 database where low-quality fingerprint images exist. The performances of the techniques presented in Refs. 9-12 get degraded if the user-specific key or token is compromised. Further, the limitation of the methods proposed in Refs. 5, 13 , and 14 lies with the accurate detection of the singular points (core or reference point). However, it is not possible to identify the singular points from fingerprint images of all users. Moreover, accurate detection of singular points from an arch type or a poor quality fingerprint image is a challenging task.
Farooq et al. 15 derived a binary representation of the different features computed from all possible triplets, which require a large number of computations. Cappelli et al. 16 introduced a state-of-the-art minutiae cylinder code (MCC)-based fingerprint representation that outperforms the most of the existing methods. However, the original MCC approach does not provide any protection mechanism for minutiae information. Later, Ferrara et al. 17 proposed the protected MCC (P-MCC) approach to secure the minutiae information. Further investigations reveal the irrevocability issue of P-MCC technique. In order to provide revocability, Ferrara et al. 18 proposed a two-factor protected minutiae cylinder code (2P-MCC) scheme that performs curtailed permutation onto cylinders in P-MCC using a secret key.
Few approaches 14, 19 in the literature utilize fixed-radius transformation. These approaches may cause performance degradation if the minutiae points are at the edge of the radius. Owing to noise or local distortion, these minutiae could be considered inside the radius for the first sample and outside the radius for the second sample for the same fingerprint. Further, Ahmad et al. 8 and Sutcu et al. 19 applied a transformation considering a threshold onto the number of minutiae point to derive the protected template. Certain methods 11, 12 directly use the position and direction information of minutiae points to derive a protected fingerprint template. However, selection of invariant features from the minutiae points results in significant performance improvement over the original minutiae information. Earlier, we have proposed a coprime mapping-based transformation to protect the original ridge features. In the prior work, 20 a very less number of brute-force attempts are required yielding the approach invertible. Moreover, the method is susceptible to the attack-via-record-multiplicity (ARM) attack. Also, the performance degrades in case of FVC2004 where the users are allowed to exaggerate deformations at the time of acquisition. In this work, we have proposed random projection-based transformation to mitigate the limitations of our prior work.
In summary, to address the limitations of the existing approaches depicted above, we propose a cancelable fingerprint template generation method based on ridge feature transformation. Ridge-based features are computed for the nearest-neighbor structure drawn for each reference minutiae point. Next, the Cantor pairing function is applied to encode the ridge features, and the logarithm function is used to uniformly distribute the paired features. Finally, the random projection is utilized to derive a noninvertible protected template. In a nutshell, we highlight the contributions of our work: 1. We have proposed a cancelable fingerprint template design methodology where transformation is applied over ridge features to cope with rotation, translation, and scale deformations in the input fingerprint image.
2. The proposed transformation does not lean upon prior alignment with the singular point, which is hard to discover in the poor quality or missing singular point fingerprint images. 3. The ridge feature transformation is applied around each minutia point to derive a feature matrix instead of fixed-radius transformation to overcome the boundary problems. 4. The Cantor pairing function followed by random projection is utilized to generate noninvertible cancelable fingerprint template. 5. The proposed scheme is analyzed with respect to the necessary criteria of cancelable template generation, i.e., noninvertibility, revocability, and diversity. Further, the method is also analyzed against different types of attacks such as preimage attack, cross-matching attack, distinguishing attack, and annealing attack.
The security analysis demonstrates that the proposed approach fulfills the desired criteria and is robust enough to prevent such attacks. 6. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated with two different protocols (FVC and 1VS1) on all datasets (i.e., DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4) of the FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006 databases. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach outperforms existing approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly summarize the existing methods related to the generation of cancelable fingerprint template. Section 3 describes the procedural steps of the proposed method. Section 4 demonstrates experimental results as well as compares the proposed method with the existing cancelable template generation approaches. Section 5 provides the security analysis of our method. Conclusions and direction of future research are presented in Sec. 6.
Related Work
In recent years, several methods have been introduced to generate cancelable template in the literature. The approaches related to the protected template generation are broadly classified into two categories, namely, biometric cryptosystem and cancelable biometrics. The current stateof-the-art concerning biometric cryptosystem is based on fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment schemes. These two schemes, fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment, are proposed by Juels and Sudan, 21 and Juels and Wattenberg, 22 respectively. Fuzzy vault scheme involves the union of minutiae encoding using chaff points and polynomial projection. Fuzzy commitment stores biometric features along with hash of identifiers and parity. In the literature, different cryptosystems [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] have been proposed in recent years. Li et al. 23 proposed a fingerprint-based cryptosystem that utilizes fuzzy vault scheme. In their work, Chaff points are merged with local structure, and Huffman encoding is applied over descriptor. Both transformed descriptors are integrated to form a protected template. Li et al. 24 proposed a cryptosystem where two stage fuzzy vault is applied over pair-polar minutiae descriptor considering each minutiae point as a reference. In the first stage, a cryptographic key is binded with the pair-polar structure while secret sharing is applied in the second stage. Finally, the protected template contains the union of these two outputs. Yang et al. 25 considered Voronoi neighbor structures ðVN s Þ over minutiae points. Next, VN s are mapped into a three-dimensional (3-D) array to generate the fixed length binary string. Finally, template protection is achieved by using PinSketch. 26 Jin et al. 27 derived cancelable template using their previous work. 30 In this approach, first, the protected template is divided into equal-sized blocks. Then, cryptographic key is blended with each block and finally concatenated each block to derive the protected template. Imamverdiyev et al. 28 evaluated Gabor filter-based FingerCode, a local binary pattern, and a local direction pattern-based features from fingerprint. These features are transformed to bit-strings, and fuzzy commitment scheme is applied over the combined bit-string to derive the protected template. Recently, Akdogan et al. 29 introduced two biometric key agreement protocols, namely secure key agreement-pure biometrics and secure key agreement-cancelable biometrics, to handle the unordered set of fingerprint features. However, in this work, we are focusing on cancelable biometric-based transformation, and we have discussed the existing literature of cancelable biometric in the following.
Ratha et al. 31 first introduced the notion of cancelable biometric with three different types of transformations (cartesian, polar, and functional) to provide privacy and security to the original biometric information. The cartesian transformation method maps the fingerprint minutiae into cells of fixed size. Minutiae positions in the cell are permuted to derive the cancelable template. In polar transformation method, minutiae positions are mapped onto a polar coordinate space. Further, the coordinate space is divided into sectors, and sector positions are shuffled based on a key to generate the cancelable template. Functional transformation method alters minutiae positions and orientations based on a parametric Gaussian function. Quan et al. 1 proved that the functional transformation could be cracked if the parameters and transformed template are revealed. The remaining two transformations cater with high equal error rate (EER). Moreover, all these methods require core-point for alignment before the transformation, and the determination of corepoint is not always feasible.
Boult et al. 32 proposed secure biotokens for fingerprint template protection. The method constructs a minutiae pair table that contains distance, relative orientation, and orientation of the line connecting two minutiae points. The features are then divided into quotient and modulus parts. The quotient part is encrypted using RSA algorithm, and modulus part is concatenated with the encrypted quotient to form a cluster. In verification stage, minutiae pair tables of the query and stored templates are traversed to construct clusters and to compute the comparison scores. Lee et al. 33 proposed an alignment-free protected fingerprint template generation scheme using minutiae orientations. They applied two different changing functions (i.e., positions and respective orientations) that are used to secure the minutiae information. The stored template can thus be regenerated and revoked by altering the input parameters of the changing functions in the situation of compromise. In biohashingbased approaches, 6,7 the protected template is derived after discretizing the inner product of the biometric features with the projection matrix. Yang et al. 34 proposed a nonlinear dynamic random projection scheme to increase the computational complexity against the inversion attack. Instead of conventional random projection utilized by biohashing, the projection matrix is dynamically constructed based on an index vector, which is created from the quantization of the biometric feature vector. Lee et al. 12 presented a method to derive cancelable fingerprint template based on 3-D array mapping. In this work, a minutia from the minutiae set is assigned as a reference, and the remaining minutiae are aligned with respect to the reference minutia. Then, the aligned minutiae points are mapped into a 3-D array based on the positions (x-y co-ordinate) and orientations of the minutiae points. The cells in the 3-D array are marked as 1, which include minutiae points. The array is sequentially traversed to derive a bit-string. The derived bit-string is exploited to random permutation utilizing a user-specific PIN and minutiae type. Wang et al. 35 proposed a template protection mechanism where many-to-one mapping is applied onto the pair-minutiae-based bit-string evaluated using the method proposed by Lee et al. 12 Then, the user-specific PIN is applied to the complex vector derived by discrete Fourier transform on bit-string. Wang et al. 10 proposed another method for cancelable fingerprint template design using circular convolution. The procedure adopted till bit-string generation is similar to its earlier method. 35 Then, a random sequence is derived by utilizing a user-specific PIN. Bit-string and random sequence are exploited to discrete Fourier transform and product of both DFTs are computed. The cancelable template is stored by applying inverse-DFT and removing the first ðp − 1Þ points from the output. Das et al. 13 constructed a graph structure based on the minimum possible distance from core/delta point to the remaining minutiae points. Correspondence search algorithms 13 are used for verification of query template. Liu et al. 14 proposed a template protection scheme that derives a protected fixed-length template viz., random local region descriptor. In this scheme, initially, a random reference point is selected. Next, Tico's sampling structure 14 is utilized to generate uniformly distributed sampling point structure around the random reference. The order of the sampling points is decided through a random seed. Finally, a protected template is derived as the angular width between the reference and sampling points. Further, gray-code encoding of sine and cosine of angular width is performed to generate a bit-string. Wong et al. 36 proposed a multiline code for minutiae-based fingerprint template protection, which is an extension of Wong et al.'s 11 work. In this method, the minutia set is divided into angular partitions with respect to a straight line drawn at the reference minutiae point. Next, few sample points with equal distance to each other are taken with uniform distribution on the straight line. Circles are constructed on each of the sample points, and minutiae points falling in each lower region (semicircle) are counted. A binary string is derived considering 1 if the count is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise. The result is stored as the cancelable template. In their extended work, 36 the mean distance from minutiae to the line is computed in each semicircle along the lines. The quantization is performed over the mean distances. The binary string is derived and permuted with a user-specific PIN to generate the cancelable template. Ahmad et al. 8 proposed a cancelable fingerprint template design scheme using many-to-one sector Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-3 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) mapping for relative minutiae information in the polar coordinate system as described in Ref. 9. Farooq et al. 15 proposed a triangular transformation that derives a binary representation of minutiae features. The method utilizes the minutiae triplet features: length of each side, the angle subtended between each side, each minutiae orientation in the triplet, and the height of triplet. These features are quantized into 24 bits to derive a 2 24 -bit binary representation. Sutcu et al. 19 introduced a geometric design that represents minutiae information into a fixed length string. The method computes mean of minutiae coordinates (x and y) as centroid. Next, a circle is created centered at centroid and divided into a number of arcs of equal angular width. Then, a straight line is drawn in between each minutiae pair, and intersection with the circumference is marked. The number of intersection marks are collected sequentially for each arc to derive the transformed template. Wang et al. 37 proposed a scheme that utilizes DFT for pairminutiae bit string. Further, the complex sequence is fed to finite-impulse-response with a user-specific key to derive the protected template. The method performs optimally yet weak against attack via record multiplicity (ARM). In their future work, Wang et al. 38 proposed a partial Hadamard-based transformation to protect the original pair minutiae bit-string. Sandhya et al. 39 proposed two different transformations that applies quantization over Delaunay triangle's features. Then, the quantized features are mapped to a 3-D array to produce a fixed length one-dimensional (1-D) bit string. Finally, DFT is employed over 1-D bit string to derive the protected template. In their other work, Sandhya et al. 40 presented a protection method by integrating local minutiae structure and distance structure. The bit-strings derived are combined using a user-specific PIN to derive a protected template.
Cappelli et al. 16 introduced a state-of-the-art MCC algorithm that frames a 3-D cylindrical structure around minutiae neighborhood considering each minutia as a reference. Each cylinder of height 2π and radius r is tessellated into a number of cells. Each cell stores the minutiae positions and orientations in the neighborhood of each minutia taken as a reference at a time. A cylinder that contains less valid information is discarded. Two cylinders are verifiable if direction difference between two minutiae is less than a certain threshold value. MCC is a fixed radius local minutiae construct that provides notable recognition performance. However, high-computation cost of cell construction for each cylinder is the drawback associated with this method. Ferrara et al. 17 then proved that few genuine minutiae points (∼25.4%) could be correctly revealed by calculating likelihood between two cylinders. Later, a representation, namely, protected-MCC (P-MCC), is proposed where a noninvertible transform has been applied onto MCC template incorporating binary-KL projection, which provides a greater level of security and privacy.
Proposed Methodology
This section describes our proposed method to derive the protected fingerprint template. The overall design flow for the proposed method is shown in Fig. 1 . The proposed method consists of three major tasks, which are displayed in rectangles in the block diagram. First, the input fingerprint image is preprocessed to extract the minutiae points by utilizing the thinned fingerprint image. Next, we form a nearestneighbor structure around each minutiae point using the ridge-based co-ordinate system and compute the ridge features from the thinned image and minutiae information. Thereafter, we apply Cantor pairing function to uniquely encode the ridge features. Finally, the random projection is applied onto the paired output to derive the protected template. In verification phase, the same mechanism is followed to generate the protected query template from the query fingerprint and comparison is performed between the protected enrolled and protected query templates in the transformed (cancelable) domain.
Preprocessing and Minutiae Extraction
Fingerprint images may have different levels of contrast throughout the image. Preprocessing is performed to enhance the quality of input fingerprint image subsequently reducing the noise. In the literature, several methods have been proposed to reduce noise and detect minutiae points from input fingerprint image. In this work, the preprocessing and extraction of minutiae points are performed by following the method presented in Ref. 41 Dwivedi and Dey: Securing fingerprint template using noninvertible ridge feature transformation E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 1 ; 6 3 ;
where V up represents the set of untransformed (raw) minutiae points detected from the input fingerprint and n is the total number of minutiae points in V up . The i'th minutiae point is denoted by m i where ðx i ; y i Þ and θ i are the coordinate positions and orientation, respectively. Also, a thinned fingerprint image is obtained during preprocessing step, which is further used for the invariant features extraction.
Nearest-Neighbor Structure Construction
We use minutiae information to create the nearest neighbor structure on the thinned fingerprint image. First, one of the minutiae point from V up is selected as a reference minutia. Next, the nearest-neighbor structure is formed in the vicinity of reference minutiae point considering the ridge-based co-ordinate system as shown in Fig. 2(a) . In the ridge-based co-ordinate system, reference axis coincides with the orientation of the selected reference minutiae. Further, we divide the fingerprint region into "s" sectors of equal angular width around the reference minutia in an anticlockwise direction.
In each sector, the nearest-neighbor minutiae point is identified by selecting the minimum distance from the reference minutiae point. This procedure is followed for all minutiae points in V up . It may be noted that if there is no minutia located in any of the sectors, we assign the nearest neighbor to be 0 in that sector. Further, we do not take into account the sectors with no minutiae point at the time of comparison. We consider eight sectors ðs ¼ 8Þ in our method as shown in Fig. 2 (a). In Fig. 2(a) , m 2 is the nearest neighbor of reference minutiae m 1 in sector 3.
Ridge Feature Computation
Accuracy of a fingerprint-based verification system could be affected by translation, rotation, and scale deformations produced during acquisition. Hence, it is necessary to compute invariant features from the input fingerprint image.
In this work, we consider ridge count and average ridge orientation between the nearest-neighbor minutiae point and reference minutiae point in each sector as invariant features.
To compute these features, first, the reference minutiae and nearest-neighbor minutiae points are identified. Then, we compute the number of ridges along the straight line between these two minutiae in the thinned image and denote the ridge count in the j'th sector as rc j . Figure 2 (a) shows a descriptive example where ridge count between the nearestneighbor minutiae point ðm 2 Þ and the reference minutiae point ðm 1 Þ is 2. To compute ridge orientation, a tangent is drawn at the intersection point of the line and ridge. Next, we measure the angle subtended by the tangent and straight line between two minutiae points for each ridge crossing the straight line. For example, the orientation ðθ k 1 1 Þ of the first ridge in the first sector as shown in Fig. 2 
where θ 1 denotes the slope of the line connecting the nearestneighbor minutiae to reference minutiae point in the first sector. θ r 1 1 is the angle subtended by the tangent line from the first ridge crossing and the reference axis. In a similar manner, we calculate the orientation θ k 2 1 of the second ridge in the first sector and compute the mean ridge orientation for the first sector. The mean ridge orientation for the j'th sector, denoted as ro j is calculated using E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 2 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 1 5 Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-5 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) where NR j represents the total number of ridges between the reference and nearest-minutiae points in the j'th sector. Similarly, we find ridge count and mean ridge orientation for all minutiae and store it as hhrc ij ; ro ij i s j¼1 i n i¼1 , where s is the number of sectors and n is the total number of minutiae points.
Cantor Pairing Function
The Cantor pairing function 42, 43 is utilized to uniquely encode two natural numbers into a single natural number. Let N ¼ 0;1; 2;3; : : : : be the set of positive integers and N × N be the set of all ordered pairs of nonnegative integers, a bijection from N × N to N is called the Cantor pairing function, which is defined as in Eq. (3).
Consider a function: π∶N × N → N such that E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 3 ; 6 3 ; 5 8 0
The motive of applying Cantor paring function is to encode the evaluated ridge features, i.e., rc and ro into one. This pairing maps multiple features into one from which it is hard to find ridge features. For each minutiae point, we compute the paired output of ridge features (rc and ro) for each sector and store in a two-dimensional matrix as defined as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 4 ; 6 3 ; 4 4 5
where rc i;j and ro i;j represent the ridge features (i.e., ridge count and mean ridge orientation) between the nearest minutiae in the j'th sector corresponding to the i'th reference minutiae. C P ði; jÞ is paired output of ridge features of the j'th sector with respect to the i'th reference minutiae. Next, we apply pointwise logarithm operation onto the paired output, C P . Here, the motivation to apply the logarithm operation is to obtain a uniform distribution of C P , which is utilized to minimize EER. Log function is defined in Eq. (5) and the base ðbÞ of log function is chosen empirically (for details see Sec. 3.3). For instance, if an input fingerprint image comprising n minutiae points is divided into "s" sectors, the matrix C P would result into n × s entries. After applying the log function, we obtain the log template ðLÞ of size n × s:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 5 ; 6 3 ; 2 2 2 Lði; jÞ ¼ log b ½C P ði; jÞ:
Random Projection
In order to derive noninvertible and revocable cancelable template, we perform random projection onto log template ðLÞ. A random projection matrix ðRÞ of size s × t is derived using a random seed, κ where t < s. Moreover, each of the entries of R is computed from a Gaussian independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) with mean equal to zero. Now, each row of log template ðLÞ is projected onto random projection matrix ðRÞ to derive the cancelable template ðC T Þ of size n × t as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 6 ; 3 2 6 ; 7 5 2
where rank ðRÞ ¼ r.
A system of linear equations claims a unique solution when ranks of the coefficient matrix as well as the augmented matrix are same. Further, if rank becomes lower than the unknowns present (i.e., r < t), the linear system leads to infinite solutions (see Appendix). Hence, R is one of those infinite solutions of Eq. (6). This random projection-based transformation guarantees the privacy and security of the proposed method. An imposter has no clue about L even if the protected template gets compromised. Further, if we consider the worst case of stolen C T and R, it would be hard to retrieve L from infinitely many possible solutions (see Sec. 5.4). The user's original information cannot be compromised even if an adversary obtains the stored fingerprint template because of the randomness present in the R.
Comparison
The comparison between enrolled and query templates is performed in the protected domain to maintain secrecy. We compute local and global similarities to evaluate overall comparison score. We use Dice coefficient to measure the local similarity between the enrolled and query templates as utilized in Ref. 36 . Finally, the likelihood of the enrolled and query templates being the two fingerprint of the same subject is measured to compute global similarity score.
Local similarity score
Let us consider, the enrolled and query protected templates are denoted by C T n×t and Q T m×t , respectively, where m and n represent the number of minutiae in the query and enrolled templates, respectively. To evaluate the local similarity score, each row of C T is cross-matched with all rows in Q T by computing the inner product of C T ði; ∶Þ and Q T ðj; ∶Þ where i ∈ 1;2; · · · ; n and j ∈ 1;2; · · · ; m. We obtain a similarity matrix simði; jÞ ∈ R n×m after applying Eq. (7) E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 7 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 2 3
where i ∈ ½1; n and j ∈ ½1; m. The i'th row of C T and the j'th row of Q T are considered to be verifiable if and only if simði; jÞ ¼ maxf½simði; 1Þ; simði; 2Þ; : : : ; simði; nÞg and simði; jÞ ¼ maxf½simð1; jÞ; simð2; jÞ; : : : ; simðm; jÞg are valid simultaneously. Therefore, each of the entries in similarity matrix is re-evaluated to eliminate double comparison in the following manner: Let where; Γ C T ðiÞ ¼ max½simði; 1Þ; : : : ; simði; mÞ;
and E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 9 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 1 0 where Γ Q T ðjÞ ¼ max½simð1; jÞ; : : : ; simðn; jÞ;
Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-6 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) be the maximum scores acquired for all minutiae in C T and Q T , respectively. Next, we construct a binary mask A ∈ f0;1g n×m , which records the positions of the coinciding maxima E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 0 ; 6 3 ; 7 0 8 Aði; jÞ ¼ δ½Γ C T ðiÞ ¼¼ Γ Q T ðjÞ ;
where δð·Þ returns 1 when the nested condition is true and 0, otherwise. Hence, the filtered similarity matrix is represented as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 1 ; 6 3 ; 6 4 3Ŝ ¼ sim⊙A;
where ⊙ represents elementwise multiplication.
Global similarity score
To perform overall comparison score between C T and Q T , the likelihood of C T and Q T being two instances of the same fingerprint is measured. From the similarity matrix ðŜÞ obtained in Eq. (12), we calculate the comparison score ðSÞ with E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 2 ; 3 2 6 ; 6 7 9 S ¼ P n i¼1 P m j¼1 d Sði; jÞ minðm; nÞ :
Algorithm 1 describes the overall comparison procedure.
Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we present the details of the experimental design and results to illustrate the performance of the proposed method. We also analyze the effect of the different parameters as well as comparison with the existing approaches.
Database Selection
We have conducted our experiment on publicly available fingerprint databases FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006 and each database contain four sets namely, DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 since most of the authors of biometrics research community utilize FVC databases. 44 Further, FVC databases contain variety of images including rotated fingerprints, scaled images due to pressure, images from elderly people, and poor quality images with dry and moistened fingerprints. Each set of the first two databases comprises 100 subjects with eight images per subject. Each set of the FVC2006 database includes 140 subjects with 12 images per subject.
Experimental Design
In accordance with the ISO standard, 45 we use the following four metrics to evaluate the performance of our method: Computation of these performance metrics involves the evaluation of genuine and imposter scores. Genuine score refers to the comparison of a fingerprint impression of a subject with the other impressions of the same subject, whereas imposter score is derived by comparing a fingerprint impression of each subject against the fingerprint impressions of all other subjects. We have also used standard FVC protocol and 1VS1 protocol to compute the performance of our method.
In 1VS1 protocol, the first fingerprint image of each subject is compared with the second fingerprint image of the same subject to compute FNMR. To measure FMR, the first image of each subject is compared with the first image of other subjects. This results to measure 100 genuine and 100 C 2 ¼ 4950 imposter scores for each set of the FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases. For each set of FVC2006 database, 140 genuine and 140 C 2 ¼ 9730 imposter scores are computed.
In the FVC protocol, each fingerprint image of a subject is compared with the remaining fingerprint images of the same subject to compute the FNMR and to evaluate the FMR, the first fingerprint image of each subject is compared with the first fingerprint image of the different subjects. This results in providing 8 C 2 × 100 ¼ 2800 genuine and 100 C 2 ¼ 4950 imposter scores computation for each set of FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases. For each set of FVC2006, 12 C 2 × 140 ¼ 9240 genuine and 140 C 2 ¼ 9730 imposter scores are computed.
Validation of Parameters
The proposed method utilizes two parameters to derive the protected fingerprint template. These parameters are: number of sectors ðsÞ in the nearest-neighbor structure (see Sec. 3.2) and log-base value ðbÞ (see Sec. 3.4) . In this section, we highlight the impact of these parameters on the performance of our approach. We have validated these parameters with respect to dataset DB1 of FVC2002, DB3 of FVC2004, and DB1 of FVC2006 using FVC protocol since they have good quality images. Table 2 . The experimental evaluation illustrates that the method performs the best on b ¼ 1.2. We observe that small value of b amplifies the distribution of paired output reducing EER. Further, EER also gets increased as the discrimination between features of different subjects gets reduced for high values of b. Therefore, we consider b ¼ 1.2 to evaluate the performance of our method.
Performance Evaluation
To measure the performance of our method, we have conducted two sets of experiments. We evaluate the performance under the same key and different key scenarios in the first and second set of experiments, respectively. Each experiment is conducted 10 times, and the average performance of 10 trials is reported in the paper.
Same key scenario
This scenario represents the situation in practice when an imposter unveils the random projection matrix ðRÞ.
We have evaluated this scenario by assigning the same R to each user present in the database. FVC2002: For FVC2002 database, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are shown in Fig. 3 for FVC and 1VS1 protocols, respectively. Out of all datasets of FVC2002, the method exhibits low EER on DB1 and DB2 for both protocols due to the presence of more number of good quality images as compared to other datasets of FVC2002. In case of DB2 dataset, we obtain an EER of 0 due to less number of intraclass comparisons for 1VS1 protocol. Further, first and second images of a subject in FVC2002 DB2 are acquired in the same session and have less variation and distortion than the other six images. However, images in DB3 and DB4 datasets of FVC2002 contain relatively poor quality images with less number of minutiae points as compared to DB1 and DB2 datasets. As a result, we achieve high EER for DB3 and DB4 datasets under both protocols. FVC2004: For FVC2004 database, the ROC curves are shown in Fig. 4 for both protocols. The method provides a high EER on DB2 for both protocols as the first two images of the DB2 dataset are heavily distorted. In addition, the small overlap area corresponding to the images of stored and a query templates is another reason for less accuracy on DB2 of FVC2004. Since, the proposed system relies on minutiae neighborhood, the lack of corresponding minutiae pair due to the limited overlapping area from the stored and query template pair causes comparison trial to fail. The method performs better on DB4, in comparison to other datasets of FVC2004 database in both protocols. Nevertheless, we achieve high EER for all four datasets of the FVC2004 database since all the users were requested to put deliberate perturbations at the time of acquisition. 44 FVC2006: For FVC2006 database, the ROC curves are shown in Fig. 5 for FVC as well as 1VS1 protocols. All these four datasets (DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2006) are selected among the heterogeneous populations (i.e., manual workers and elderly people) allowing the most difficult fingerprints according to quality index with explicit distortions such as large amounts of rotation and displacement, wet/dry impressions, etc. The dataset DB1 contains small sized poor quality images with missing minutiae. Therefore, the method produces high EER on the DB1 dataset. The method performs optimally on the DB2 dataset for both protocols due to the presence of relatively good quality images. Dataset DB3 and DB4 consist of more number of poor quality images in comparison to DB2. Therefore, it is observed that the performance of the method degrades heavily for DB3 and DB4 datasets of FVC2006 database.
Further, we also observe that the proposed method performs better with 1VS1 protocol compared to standard FVC protocol. The reason lies in the number of genuine verification attempts. In case of 1VS1 protocol, the first two images of the same user are utilized, whereas all eight images from each user are utilized in the genuine verification for the standard FVC protocol. However, we achieve high EER for 1VS1 protocol as compared to FVC protocol for the DB3 and DB4 datasets of the FVC2006 database since the first two images are noisy and involve nonoverlapping regions.
Different key scenario
In the second set of experiments, we assign the different projection matrices to the different users by altering the seed value and test our method for both the protocols. For FVC2002, our method performs ideal for all datasets (EER ¼ 0) with both protocols. Moreover, we achieve an EER of 0 for DB1 and DB2 datasets of FVC2004. DB3 and DB4 datasets consist of more number of poor quality images with very few or missing minutiae in comparison to datasets DB1 and DB2. For DB3 and DB4 dataset, the method gives EERs of 0.08 and 0.03, respectively. For FVC2006, we achieve an EER close to 0 for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 using FVC and 1VS1 protocols. Therefore, it is evident that the performance of the method in the different key scenario is almost ideal for all datasets.
Comparison of With and Without Transformation
To perform a fair comparison, the verification performance of the proposed cancelable biometric system is analyzed with respect to the baseline biometric system (i.e., original ridge features). Further, a comparison process relying on the original minutiae should be taken into account, since the employed ridge-based representation is already part of the process generating the proposed protected templates. Therefore, we compare the performance of the method under three scenarios, i.e., original minutiae comparison, original ridge features comparison, and protected templates comparison. In this experiment, first we compute the performance for original minutiae comparison based on adaptive image enhancement method proposed by Bartunek et al. 46 The approach involves publicly available Bozorth3 minutiae matcher 47 from NIST to evaluate the performance. Next, we compute the performance using original ridge features of the query and stored templates. Further, we apply the proposed approach to derive cancelable template and compare the stored and query templates in the transformed domain. Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-10 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) ridge-based computation outperforms the original minutiae comparison since Bozorth3 does not perform well for poor quality fingerprint images with fewer minutiae points. Further, Bozorth3 is not robust against the alignment and scale deformations present between the stored and query templates. Therefore, it is evident that the proposed method performs better than the Bozorth3 matcher. For FVC protocol, the reported results in Table 3 exhibit that there is a minor degradation of 0.19%, 0.15%, 0.05%, and 0.07% in the performance for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2002, 0.053%, 0.07%, 0.033%, and 0.04% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2004, and 0.04%, 0.14%, 0.037%, and 0.32% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2006, respectively, with reference to the original ridge features. The performance degradation occurs due to cancelable transformation. For 1VS1 protocol, the reported results in Table 4 indicate that the performance is degraded by 0%, 0.85%, 0.08%, and 0.09% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2002, 0.05%, 0.11%, 0.04%, and 0.05% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2004 and 0.048%, 2.0%, 0.09%, and 0.17% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 of FVC2006, respectively, with reference to the original ridge features. Therefore, we can conclude that performance degradation produced by the transformation is very low.
Comparison with the Existing Cancelable
Biometric Approaches The approaches in Refs. 8, [32] [33] [34] [35] 37 , and 38 used FVC 2002 database to evaluate the performance of their method using standard FVC protocol. Further, Wong et al. 11 also evaluated the performance on DB1 of FVC2004. In addition to each dataset of FVC2002, Ferrara et al. 17, 18 evaluated their methods on DB1 of FVC2004 and DB2 of FVC2006. The authors Yang et al. 34 and Wang et al. 37 evaluated the performance on DB2 of FVC2002 with the 1VS1 protocol. Ferrara et al. 17, 18 also evaluated their methods on DB2 of FVC2006 and each datasets of FVC2002 database for 1VS1 protocol. Therefore, we compare our method with these current state-of-the-art approaches 8, 11, 17, 18, [32] [33] [34] [35] 37, 38 in the literature. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the comparison in terms of EER on different FVC datasets for 1VS1 and FVC protocols, respectively. From Table 5 , we observe that the best result reported in existing literature is EER ¼ 0, 0.02, 3.43, 3.37, and 0.03 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3, FVC2002DB4, and FVC2006DB2, respectively, whereas our approach yields EER of 0, 0.13, 3.39, 3.02, and 0.09 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3, FVC2002DB4, and FVC2006DB2, respectively. From Table 6 , we observe that the best result reported in existing literature is EER ¼ 1, 0.99, 5.24, 4.84, 10.36, and 0.17 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3, FVC2002DB4, FVC2004DB1, and FVC2006DB2, respectively, whereas our approach gives EER of 1.75, 0.98, 4.02, 3.74, 4.38, and 0.14 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3, FVC2002DB4, FVC2004DB1, and FVC2006DB2, respectively. However, we can observe that the performance of the proposed method for the DB2 dataset of FVC2002 and FVC2006 is slightly lower than Ref. 17 in 1VS1 protocol and the EER of FVC2002DB1 is lower than that of Wang et al., 38 but it is comparable. The proposed method outperforms existing methods due to the improvements in invariant feature evaluation, feature encoding, and random projection-based transformation. We evaluate ridge features (i.e., ridge count and mean ridge orientation) in comparison to the pair-minutiae distance, 8 relative orientation-based methods, 8, 33 and the geometrical transformation based techniques. 11 In our method, ridge features are utilized to cope up scale, translational, and rotational deformations in comparison to the other existing literature described in Sec. 2. The methods proposed by Yang et al. 34 and Boult et al. 32 applied quantization over feature string. Hence, a small perturbation may output a different index or regions. Our approach performs better as it involves ridge-based co-ordinate system to evaluate features. In our method, logarithm and random projection-based transformations lead to superior performance over other state-of-theart since these reduce the intraclass variation and seize substantial discrimination among templates of different users. In addition, it also involves simpler (less complex) transformation in comparison to DFT-based approaches 35, 37, 38 in the literature. The methods proposed in Refs. 17 and 18 are vulnerable to annealing attack. 2 Our method performs better than the methods proposed by Ferrara et al., 17, 18 since it overcomes the scenario of annealing attack 2 (see Sec. 5.4). Hence, it is evident that the proposed transformation outperforms the existing methods.
Security Analysis
The security of the derived protected template is guaranteed when an adversary has no information about the transformation. If an adversary unveils any information about cancelable transformation, the security of the proposed system is guaranteed by three factors: noninvertibility, revocability, and diversity. In this section, we analyze our method with respect to these three contexts.
Noninvertibility
The term noninvertibility refers to that it should be computationally infeasible to derive the original fingerprint template from the protected template. Note that a randomized projection matrix ðRÞ is utilized to generate a cancelable template from the log template ðLÞ. To meet the noninvertibility requirement, we have adopted a reference architecture proposed by Breebaart et al. 4 Figure 6 shows the reference architecture where the protected template ðC T Þ, random projection matrix ðRÞ, and the parameters (s, b) can be presumed as pseudoidentity, auxiliary data, and supplementary data, respectively.
In the reference architecture, the protected template ðC T Þ is derived at the enrollment phase. The biometric sample, ridge features, and the parameter (s, b) are destroyed after the successful verification of the stored protected and query protected templates. Due to privacy preservation, it may be either issued for a limited period or may be required for revocation when compromised. Moreover, the biometric characteristics may get affected due to aging effects. Hence, it requires renewal after a validity period regulated through watch list. The protected template C T along with the R and supplementary data (s, b) are stored in the database. During verification, a protected query template ðC T 0 Þ is generated from the issued R, biometric sample, and the parameters (s, b). Next, the stored protected template ðC T Þ and the query protected template ðC T 0 Þ are forwarded to a comparator/matching server via a communication interface to verify the identity. In this section, we analyze the criterion of noninvertibility with three different architectural components, i.e., database, matching server, and communication interface for information exchange.
Compromised database
In this scenario, an attacker can reveal the database, i.e., protected template ðC T Þ and the random projection matrix ðRÞ.
On the possession of these information, the attacker would not be able to retrieve the log template ðLÞ since the size of R is s × t where t < s and the entries of R s×t are independent Table 6 Performance comparison with existing cancelable approaches for FVC protocol (values in percentages).
Datasets

Methods
Ahmad et al. 8 Wang et al. 35 Lee et al. 33 Wong et al. 11 Yang et al. 34 Boult et al. 32 Ferrara et al. 17 Ferrara et al. 18 Wang et al. 37 Wang et al. 38 Proposed method 
indicates that the author(s) have not reported the results or results are reported for partial dataset, in their work.
Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-12 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables. Evaluation of L n×s from C T n×t results to find a solution for underdetermined system because it is hard to find s unknowns from t linearly independent equations where t < s. Further, it has also been proved by Du et al. 48 that if the projection matrix follows the condition t ≤ s 2 and entries in R are i.i.d., it is very hard to find the L from C T . Moreover, even if the attacker achieves supplementary information (s, b), it would be infeasible to unveil the L as analyzed in the third scenario, i.e., compromised communication interface.
Compromised matching server
Let us assume that an attacker unveils a matching server, i.e., the stored protected template ðC T Þ and query protected template ðC T 0 Þ. Next, the attacker tries to evaluate L by correlating the information contained in C T and C T 0 . In this situation, an attacker would not be able to retrieve L since he does not have any information about R.
Compromised communication interface
In this scenario, an attacker may have control over communication interface between the database and matching server. In this situation, the adversary would be able to estimate the stored protected template ðC T Þ, query protected template ðC T 0 Þ, and the random projection matrix ðRÞ. On the possession of these information, the attacker may utilize C T and R, or C T 0 and R to retrieve the log template ðLÞ. This situation is identical to the first scenario, i.e., compromised database. Further, the attacker may correlate C T and C T 0 to evaluate L. This situation is same as the second scenario, i.e., compromised matching server.
Further, we assume that the attacker unveils the approximate L by applying known key distinguishing attack. In this situation, the imposter tries to estimate C P or approximate C P using the value of parameter b. However, it would not be possible to retrieve the original ridge features since inversion involves computation of a square root, which gives one to many correspondences as defined in Eqs. (13)-(16):
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 3 ; 6 3 ; 1 1 1 w ¼
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 4 ; 3 2 6 ; 5 4 1
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 5 ; 3 2 6 ; 5 1 6
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 6 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 9 1
where rc, ro, and C P represent the ridge count, mean ridge orientation, and transformed paired output, respectively. w and t are the intermediate values in the calculation and bc is the floor function. Hence, it would be very difficult to invert C P to attain the original ridge features. Therefore, it can be stated that our method preserves the criterion of noninvertibility.
Revocability
The term revocability refers to the design of a new protected template if the stored template gets leaked. The newly generated template should be adequately dissimilar to the compromised one. In this work, a new protected template can be issued just by altering R. To ensure the potent revocability, the biometric templates that are derived by applying different Rs for the same user in different applications should not be able to verify each other. Here, the random projection is motivated by the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) lemma described in Ref. 49 . The lemma states that: For any 0 < ϵ < 1 and an integer k, let t be a positive integer such that t ≥ t 0 ¼ Oðϵ −2 log kÞ. For any set B of k points in R s , there exists a map f∶R s → R t such that: for all u; v ∈ B This lemma provides a proof that the similarity between any two vectors can be preserved up to a factor of ϵ when these vectors are projected onto a random t-dimensional subspace. Such type of mapping can be performed by utilizing a matrix containing orthonormal columns as described in Lemma 5.2. 50 The lemma states that: Let R be a matrix of size s × t where t < s. Each of the entries of R are i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance 1 s , r ij ∼ sð0; 1 s Þ, i ¼ 1; · · · ; s, j ¼ 1; · · · ; t. Let W ¼ R T R and W 0 ¼ RR T ; then E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 8 ; 6 3 ; 6 7 3 Eðw i;j Þ ¼
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 9 ; 6 3 ; 6 1 4 Eðw 0 i;j Þ ¼ t
where w i;j and w 0 i;j are elements of W and W 0 , respectively. The output here confirms that E½R T R ¼ I, where I denotes an identity matrix. The elements of R T R are centered around their mean with very small variance. This suggests that vectors with random directions are close to orthogonal (i.e., R T R ≈ I). Further, it is obvious that if r ij ∼ sð0; 1 s Þ, then, E½kr j k 2 ¼ E½
where r j denotes individual columns of R. This mathematical proof ensures that columns in R are saturated around one which signifies that the vectors in R are nearly orthonormal. For revocable biometric template generation, we evaluate the probability of false match when the biometric data of the same user are exploited with the different random projection matrices, denoted as P fm . Therefore, the revocability, i.e., probability of a protected template being revocable can be defined as: P r ¼ 1 − P fm . The higher value of P r corresponds to better revocability. In general, zero P fm cannot be obtained if we apply random projection directly onto the biometric data ðLÞ. Further, this probability can be reduced by adding an extra vector d ∈ R s , d i ≫ th to the L, L 0 ¼ L þ d, where th denotes the threshold of verification system. 51 In similar manner, the biometric templates with P r ≈ 1 could be derived, if different random projection matrices are exploited on the original template of the same user nullifying the record multiplicity attack. 1 In this work, we achieve P r ¼ 0.982 corresponding to a threshold, th ¼ 0.65.
We also verify this security aspect empirically by generating 100 different protected templates using 100 different projection matrices from the same finger. Next, we perform a comparison of these 100 templates with the originally enrolled template to obtain the pseudoimposter scores. We achieve mean and variance of (0.7519; 0.018), (0.3982; 0.177), and (0.3563; 0.189) for genuine, imposter, and pseudoimposter distributions, respectively. These values indicate that mean and variance for the pseudoimposter distribution are at a distant to genuine distribution and near toward the imposter distribution. Moreover, we obtain FMR ¼ 0, which depicts that all queries are rejected. This signifies that the derived templates are dissimilar to the enrolled templates for the same finger. Although, the templates are generated from the same finger pattern, they are uncorrelated to each other. Therefore, the claim of revocability is preserved.
Diversity
The characteristics of diversity state are that it should derive numerous templates and these derived templates should not provide positive biometric claim over other applications to avoid cross-matching. In our method, multiple fingerprint templates can be derived by choosing the different projection matrices ðRÞ with the different seed values ðκÞ. In addition, the two parameters illustrated in Sec. 4.3; the number of sectors ðsÞ and log-base value ðbÞ can also be utilized to derive numerous templates. The derived protected templates are sufficiently different from the raw fingerprint template, which indicates that a user can enroll itself with different templates in different applications without any cross-matching. Hence, it has been confirmed that the method validates the property of diversity.
Other Attacks
We also analyze the possibility of different types of attacks namely attacks via record multiplicity, preimage, crossmatching, distinguishing, and annealing attacks to validate the robustness of the proposed work.
ARM: This is a scenario where the attacker employs multiple stolen protected templates with or without associated parameters to generate the original template. 52 If the attacker is able to reveal enough protected templates and their corresponding random projection matrices, the series of linear equations can be solved to obtain the approximate entries of log template. Further, if the projection matrix follows the conditions t ≤ s 2 and entries in R are i.i.d., it is very hard to find the L from C T . If an adversary is able to retrieve the C T and corresponding Rs from different applications, he can append Rs columnwise such that ½R 1 R 2 · · · R n ¼ s. Further, the adversary solves linear system of equations to obtain the original log template, L. In spite of this effort, he would not be able to generate the actual L because different applications utilize different samples of the same subject where the intravariance is present among the features. Hence, L would not be exactly the same for different samples of the same subject. Moreover, it would be very unlikely that the attacker is able to reveal different protected templates alongwith the corresponding R for the same user from different applications. Further, even if the attacker is able to compute approximate L, he has to compute C P by inverse log operation using b value. From paired output C P , the attacker has to evaluate Eqs. (13)-(16) to compute ridge features. As inversion of paired output, C P results into multiple values, it would be very hard to evaluate the original ridge features (rc, ro). Therefore, it is evident that our approach is resilient enough against ARM attack when a user enrolls himself by different impressions of same fingerprint. However, if the user uses same biometric impressions for different applications, the proposed technique may not resist over ARM attack. This limitation would be looked in the future.
Preimage attack: In this attack, the attacker can utilize multiple protected instances to derive a preimage instance. Knowledge of security can also be challenged using feature order with different projection matrices to create a fake template. Biohashing-based methods 6, 7, 53, 54 derive binary string by projecting feature vectors with user-specific random numbers. In contrast, the bit-string could be easily exploited to disclose original minutiae information. Moreover, the projection matrix in biohashing is not only a square matrix but Journal of Electronic Imaging 053031-14 Sep∕Oct 2018 • Vol. 27 (5) also have orthonormal row vectors, i.e., R proj · R T proj ¼ I, where R T proj is the pseudoinverse of R proj , and I is the identity matrix. This makes the biohashing methods vulnerable to preimage attack. However, the proposed random projection-based transformation is different from the methods involving biohashing. Here, the random projection is utilized to hide the log template among infinitely many possible solutions. Also, our method does not depend on the order of feature components while generating the original as well as the protected template. Further, any value could not be investigated from two projected feature vectors in any position due to a difference in the size of enrolled and query templates. Hence, preimage attack could not be utilized to derive the original template in our method.
Cross-matching attack: The cross-matching attack refers to the scenario where an adversary is able to compromise the databases stored in different applications. The protected templates each from different applications are analyzed to restore the original template. However, the random projection transformation described in Eq. (6) avoids any possibility of cross-matching attack across different applications.
Distinguishing attack: In the distinguishing attack, 55 an imposter tries to utilize the same protected template captured from different applications to derive the original template by correlating the information. To prevent this, different protected templates can be utilized in the different applications. However, the attacker can retrieve different protected templates ðC T Þ along with the known random projection matrices ðRÞ from the different applications in the known-key distinguishing attack. In this situation, the attacker would be able to unveil log template ðLÞ. Further, he may estimate the paired output ðC P Þ or approximate C P using the value of b or approximately equal to b. However, it is not possible to derive the original ridge features since the Cantor pairing function is irreversible as defined in Eqs. (13)-(16) (for details, see Sec. 5.1).
Annealing attack: In this attack, 2 the protected template is divided into multiple regions, and some regions of a sample template are paired with some regions of the reference template to evaluate similarity score. If the similarity score exceeds the threshold, the vicinity corresponding to sample's region is included in the gummy template. This step is repeated until it outputs a gummy template including all matched vicinities. Our approach is robust against this type of attack due to the following reasons:
1. Our approach evaluates the nearest-neighbor minutiae point for each minutiae point causing different radii to different minutiae points. Hence, it is very hard to map the gummy template with the original template which is derived from the multiple regions with the variable radius. 2. Ridge-based features are utilized for the neighboring minutiae in each sector instead of relative distances or the directional difference between minutiae pairs. Here, the measured ridge features are invariant to the interridge distances and locations of minutiae points.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed prealignment free cancelable fingerprint template generation technique. The proposed technique does not rely on detection of singular points. We divide the input fingerprint image into a number of sectors of equal angular width considering each minutia as a reference and use the nearest-neighbor minutiae point in each sector to compute transformation invariant ridge count and mean ridge orientation features from each sector. Cantor pairing function is applied to uniquely encode these features. Further, the pointwise logarithm operation is exploited to yield uniformly distributed features. Finally, a random projection is adopted to derive a noninvertible and revocable cancelable template. Experimental evaluation performed over four datasets of FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006 databases depicts that the significant performance improvement is achieved as compared to the current state-ofthe-art techniques. Moreover, the security analysis of our work confirms that our approach fulfills the desired characteristics of template protection schemes and preserves the recognition performance too. However, the proposed ridgebased feature computation for low-quality fingerprint and partial fingerprint images is still a demanding area. The proposed transformation may get affected due to ARM attack if the attacker reveals different protected templates from different applications. Hence, we are keen to proceed in the direction of handling ARM attack over random projection-based transformation. Further, the computational complexity of the proposed method is Oðn 2 Þ. Hence, future work along the direction to reduce/improve computational complexity is underway.
Appendix: Propositions: Random Projection-Based Noninvertible Transformation
Proposition 1: A linear nonhomogeneous system of equations such as C T ¼ L · R including s unknowns and n equations contain an infinite number of solutions.
Proof: Initially, we claim that C T ¼ L · R is solvable. It is evident from Eq. (6) in the revised manuscript that C T is a linear combination of columns of R, which states that C T lies in the column space of R. Hence, rank ðRÞ ¼ rankð½ R C T Þ. Due to same rank of coefficient matrix and augmented matrix, a solution exists for
Next, since rank ðRÞ ¼ r < t, there are infinitely many possible solutions to Eq. (6) in the revised paper. The proposition illustrates that C T is concealed among infinitely many possible solutions, which become infeasible to an attacker even if he/she unveils C T and R. The attacker would not be able to achieve true biometric template as evaluation of pseudoinverse results obsolete as shown in the following example:
Example: Suppose, we have one row of log template and random projection matrix as follows: where R † denotes pseudoinverse of R. Concurrently, we evaluate another solution manually p i L ¼ ½0 0 0.3396 0.8692. Hence, it is verified that p i L · R ¼ C T and p i L · R ¼ C T . This random projection-based transformation guarantees the privacy and security of the proposed method. An imposter has no clue about L even if the protected template gets compromised. Further, if we consider the worst case of stolen C T and R, it would be very hard to retrieve L from infinitely many possible solutions. We illustrate this with a mathematical proof. 56 Proposition 2: An underdetermined system of linear equations either contains an infinite number of solutions or become inconsistent.
Proof: Consider this linear and underdetermined system, C T ¼ L · R [see Eq. (6) in the revised paper].
We assume that C T ¼ L · R has infinitely many solutions. Let P be the n × s matrix 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 1 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 · · · 1 0
We defineR ≔ P · R. Further we evaluate E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; x 1 ; 6 3 ; 2 9 8L ¼ min x kP · R − C T k 2 2 subject to the constraint kL · R − C T k 2 2 ¼ 0. For evaluation ofL, the ðλL T L þ P T PÞ −1 must exist for all λ > 0, this is nontrivial. Hence,L achieved may look similar to L, but it would not be identical.
